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 Documents published by ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and 
Qualification, belong to one of the following three types: 
 
 
Type 1 – Consensus Document  
A consensus document contains harmonised principles, methodologies, approaches 
and procedures, and stresses the degree of harmonisation on the subject among 
ENIQ members. 
 
 
Type 2 – Position/Discussion Document 
A position/discussion document may contain compilations of ideas, expressions of 
opinion, reviews of practices, or conclusions and recommendations from technical 
projects.  
 
 
Type 3 – Technical Report 
A technical report is a document containing results of investigations, compilations of 
data, reviews and procedures without expressing any specific opinion or valuation on 
behalf of ENIQ. 
 
 
 
The present document “ENIQ TGR Discussion Document on the Role of In-Service 
Inspection Within the Philosophy of Defence In Depth” (ENIQ Report nr. 29) is a 
type-2 document. 
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 FOREWORD 
 
The present work is the outcome of activities undertaken by the ENIQ Task Group 
Risk (TGR) on Risk-Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI).  
 
ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection and Qualification, was set up in 1992 and 
reflects the importance of the issue of qualification of NDE inspection procedures 
used in in-service inspection programmes for nuclear power plants. Driven by 
European Nuclear Utilities and managed by the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in Petten, the Netherlands, ENIQ was intended to be a 
network in which the available resources and expertise could be managed at 
European level. It was also recognised that harmonisation in the field of codes and 
standards for inspection qualification would represent important advantages for all 
parties involved, with the ultimate goal of increasing the safety of European nuclear 
power plants. More information on the ENIQ network and its activities can be found at 
http://safelife.jrc.nl/eniq/. 
 
ENIQ work is carried out by two sub-groups: the Task Group on Qualification (TGQ) 
focuses on the qualification of in-service inspection (ISI) systems, while the Task 
Group on Risk (TGR) focuses on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) issues. 
The TGR has published the European Framework Document for Risk-informed In-
service Inspection, and is producing more detailed recommended practices and 
discussion documents on several specific RI-ISI issues. 
 
This document is intended as a basis for discussion on how to apply defence-in-depth 
concepts within a Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) framework. The report 
discusses the role of the RI-ISI programme (and connected activities) within the entire 
reactor safety programme, with a special focus on the defence-in-depth philosophy for 
reactor safety.  
 
The active members of the ENIQ Task Group on Risk are: V. Chapman (OJV 
Consultancy Ltd, United Kingdom), C. Cueto-Felgueroso (Tecnatom, Spain), 
A. Eriksson (JRC, The Netherlands), C. Faidy (EDF, France), R. Fuchs (Kernkraftwerk 
Leibastadt AG, Switzerland), L. Gandossi (JRC, The Netherlands), L. Horacek (NRI, 
Czech Republic), G. Hultqvist (Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB, Sweden), W. Kohlpaintner 
(E.ON Kernkraft, Germany), P. Lacaille (Areva, France), A. Leijon (Ringhals AB, 
Sweden), D. Lidbury (Serco Assurance, United Kingdom), J. Lotman (Forsmark 
Kraftgrupp AB, Sweden), E. Mathet (Areva, France), K. Nilsson (Ringhals AB, 
Sweden), P. O’Regan (EPRI, United States), T. Schimpfke (GRS, Germany), 
B. Shepherd (Mitsui Babcock, United Kingdom), K. Simola (VTT, Finland), J. Slechten 
(Tractebel, Belgium), L. Ulloa (Westinghouse Energy Systems Europe, Spain), 
A. Walker (Rolls-Royce, United Kingdom), A. Weyn (AIB-Vinçotte International, 
Belgium). 
 
This ENIQ type-2 document was approved for publication by the ENIQ Task Group on 
Risk. The author of this report is Göran Hultqvist of Forsmark Kraftgrupp AB. The 
document was edited by Luca Gandossi of JRC and Kaisa Simola of VTT, with the 
assistance of DGT's Editing Unit. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In-service inspection (ISI), which consists of non-destructive examination and 
pressure/leakage testing, is an essential element of the defence-in-depth (DID) 
concept. ISI helps to confirm that the basic nuclear safety functions are preserved and 
to reduce the probability of radioactive materials breaching containment. In practice, 
the main purpose of ISI is to examine the critical components of pressure boundaries 
(pipes, welds, bends, etc.) in order to confirm that no defects or deficiencies are 
present or – if they are – to ensure that they are detected as early as possible, before 
they affect the safe operation of the plant. 
 
Risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) aims at rational plant safety management 
by taking into account the results of plant-specific risk analyses. The fundamental idea 
is to identify high-risk locations where the inspection efforts should be concentrated. 
The objective is to bring about a continuous improvement in overall plant safety 
measured by risk, together with reduced doses for the inspection teams. 
 
Risk is defined here in the broad engineering sense as the product of the 
consequences of a failure and the probability of that failure occurring, as follows: 
 
 Risk = Probability of Failure x Consequence of that Failure 
 
In the nuclear industry, quantitative calculations of risks associated with plant 
operation and maintenance are carried out in probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). 
Risk is measured in terms of the frequency of occurrence of various events, leading to 
a consequence of interest (e.g. core damage or release of radioactive material). In the 
most basic PSAs (level 1) risk measurement is usually expressed as the core damage 
frequency (CDF). Components that significantly contribute to core damage frequency 
are thus given priority in a risk-informed inspection programme. If a more detailed 
PSA study (level 2, for instance) is available, risk measurement can be expressed in 
terms of large early release frequency (LERF). Similar consideration can thus be 
given to components whose contribution to LERF is higher but which do not top the 
list for CDF (usually, a minor group of components). 
 
Developing an RI-ISI programme involves evaluating the first version of a new 
inspection programme against the defence-in-depth principle. The risk-informed 
inspection programme generated at the end of the analysis should be evaluated 
against the DID principle to see if more inspections are needed with a view to creating 
a more robust inspection programme.  
 
Unfortunately, DID concepts are used incorrectly in many applications, by dint of only 
looking at the effect on one single barrier. This report discusses how to apply DID 
concepts by looking at several DID levels. Further, this report looks at the role of the 
in-service inspection programme (and connected activities) within the entire reactor 
safety programme, with special focus on the defence-in-depth philosophy for reactor 
safety. More specifically, the report deals with such issues as:  
 
• the role of ISI within the defence-in-depth concept; 
• the tools and the processes used to determine pipe break frequencies;  
• a perspective on pipe break frequency's contribution to core damage frequency.
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 2 THE DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH CONCEPT 
 
The concept of defence in depth is fundamental to the safety of nuclear power plants. 
This section is based on the definitions and strategies described in IAEA’s INSAG 10 
report [Ref. 1].  
 
Essentially, the concept of defence in depth has led to five successive strategy levels. 
It uses various tools to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed between 
radioactive materials and the biosphere.  
Defence in depth is defined by two principles: accident prevention and accident 
mitigation. This high-level definition has traditionally been broken down into five levels. 
Should one level fail, the subsequent level comes into play. The demands on the 
subsequent levels must be set independently and without taking any credit for earlier-
level actions. The objectives of the levels are described below. 
 
 
Table 1 Five levels of defence in depth 
Level Objective 
1 Prevention of abnormal operation and failures (conservative, robust design, high-quality performance) 
2 Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures (supervision, surveillance) 
3 Control of accident within the design basis (engineered safety features/systems and accident management) 
4 Control of severe plant conditions, prevention of accident progression and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents 
5 Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive materials (off-site emergency response) 
 
 
In-service inspection and related issues are mainly part of (but not limited to) level 2. 
This level is preceded by a preventive level (level 1) and followed by a mitigating level 
(level 3) that comes into play if failure detection fails or is inappropriate.  
 
Plant design (level 1) must be such that ISI can be performed on all-important 
components. Design, as well as design modifications, should take into account the 
information obtained from ISI performed in the plant and worldwide. This will make the 
plant safer and reduce the need for ISI in the first place. 
 
At level 3, the design of engineered safety features (safety systems) is based on the 
assumed failure of the design level (level 1) and maintenance activities such as 
supervision, surveillance or inspections (level 2). Experience from ISI worldwide could 
affect level 3 by demanding a scaled-up or scaled-down safety system design. 
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 Thus there is a feedback loop from ISI to design state and demands on safety 
systems, which is part of the overall safety aspects with a long-term safety impact. 
Without ISI the feedback loop would be much slower, and the experience would 
consist of leaks and breaks instead of early indications of cracks and wall thinning. 
 
The ISI programme should be developed to protect against failure at the design state. 
Deficiencies in the maintenance programme (including the ISI programme) failing to 
detect failures should be covered by the of safety system functions (defence-in-depth 
level 3). 
 
Defence–in-depth levels are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
2.1 Level 1 Prevention of failures: Design and quality issues  
To avoid pipe breaks, the reactor safety programme includes the following actions and 
design considerations in the defence-in-depth programme: 
 
• Design of pipes and welding procedures with a high quality level. This comprises 
the choice of material, the choice of welding method and technique and welding 
qualification, plant design issues in terms of minimising loads, vibrations etc from 
normal operation and transient conditions.  
 
• A water chemistry programme that reduces the stresses, corrosion attacks or 
other challenges on the materials in order to avoid deficiencies or failures to 
propagate.  
 
 
2.2 Level 2 Detection of failures: In-service inspection issues  
To detect deficiencies and to gain further knowledge of failure mechanisms the 
following actions should be taken: 
 
• Establish an ISI programme to examine the piping and welds, based on 
knowledge of various parameters like pipe materials, welding techniques, water 
chemistry, environmental impact, potential failure mechanism, failure propagation 
etc.  
 
• Evaluate operating experiences (OPE) from other plants with similar design and 
operating conditions, by transferring knowledge from OPE to the ISI programme 
and design procedures and demands. 
 
• Ensure that the inspection programme covers the way systems function in normal 
operation in stand-by mode (safety systems). 
 
 
2.3 Level 3 Control of accidents: Consequence mitigation on leakage  
A set of actions and strategies are geared to mitigating the effect of leakages and pipe 
breaks of all kinds as they occur. The actions must be totally independent of the 
results or effectiveness of the actions taken at level 1 or level 2 described above. The 
following steps should be taken:  
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 • Detect leakages from the primary coolant piping. Leak detection system and leak 
rate measurement facilities are installed (temperatures, pressure, humidity, and 
level/inventory). When the leak rate exceeds a specific set point the reactor 
protection system is initiated. Such systems are able and qualified to detect 
leakage flow rates in the range of 10 kg/s or higher.  
 
• Design Emergency core cooling (ECC) systems that fulfil the demands for LOCA 
events (10CFR50.46 and appendix K [Ref. 2]). The design capability of the ECC 
systems is set to cope with a guillotine break of the largest pipe connected to the 
reactor vessel, applying a set of conservative design requirements. The ECC 
function includes both high and low pressure safety injection and an automatic 
depressurisation system. 
 
• The availability of ECC support systems, such as power supply, service water, 
reactor protection circuits and logics, is kept at a high level by the design quality 
and the test programme set out in the technical specifications.  
 
• The next activity barrier, the containment, is designed, during the course of an 
accident, to keep almost all activity within rigorous design limits. Also, severe 
LOCA events beyond design specifications do not exceed the set limits on 
radiological releases to the environment (NRC Regulatory Guides 1.3, Ref. 3, and 
1.183, Ref. 4). The control room ventilation system is designed to protect 
operators from critical doses. 
 
 
2.4 Subsequent levels  
Under the DID philosophy, it is assumed that measures considered at the first three 
levels will limit potential hazards for members of the public. Nevertheless, additional 
efforts are made to further reduce the risk, in a number of ways. The most important 
objective in terms of mitigating the consequences of an accident is to protect the 
containment (level 4). 
 
Should even this barrier fail, off-site emergency plans are in place to limit the 
consequences of severe accidents involving any release of radioactive material to the 
environment (level 5). 
 
 
2.5 Summary  
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate how the ISI programme fits into the 
defence-in-depth concept as an important element of the entire philosophy. It can be 
stated that:  
 
• The ISI programme should be seen as part of an independent line of defence 
within that concept (level 2). Feedback from ISI experience will affect the other 
levels. 
 
• Subsequent levels (3-5) are designed to be independent of the effectiveness of 
level 2. 
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 • Changes in the ISI programme and performance will not have any major impact 
on the design of other lines of defence. The changes will be based on new 
knowledge from worldwide and plant experience and ISI. 
 
• Changes in “ISI performance” may, after several years, result in changes in 
worldwide pipe break frequencies. This will affect design rules and safety 
philosophy, especially at DID level 3, after several years of consistent change. 
The ongoing work to redefine LOCA demands is based on this knowledge and 
will affect the design of many safety systems. 
 
• Overall plant safety and risk depends on the effects of all defence levels. In this 
context, the ISI programme mostly affects plant safety and risk in cases where 
there are weaknesses or limitations in the other lines of defence. PSA is an 
effective means of identifying such areas, as PSA evaluates all systems and their 
interaction without any reference to deterministic demands or system 
classification. 
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 3  OPTIMISATION OF ISI PROGRAMME 
 
To optimise an ISI programme based on reactor safety aspects, it is important to 
realise that DID has practical drawbacks at all five levels. 
 
1. The design and materials are not perfect. 
 
2. ISI activities (or other preventive maintenance activities) will possibly miss 
some flaws. 
 
3. The design and performance of the safety system may fail to deal with some 
kinds of events. 
 
4. The containment will not withstand every kind of load. 
 
5. The pre-planned mitigation actions, as the emergency operating procedures, 
will not be perfect. 
 
Optimising an ISI programme will therefore depend on the weaknesses at the different 
defence–in-depth levels, mainly at levels 1 and 3. If those weaknesses are reduced or 
eliminated by some other means (such as plant modifications), the content of an 
optimised ISI programme will be affected. Optimisation of an ISI programme will also 
have to address the quality of the inspections (e.g. inspection reliability).  
 
PSA studies can be used to pinpoint the weaknesses at the various defence-in-depth 
levels, and are thus a good way of optimising the ISI programme. The weaknesses 
are presented in risk terms, and the influence on CDF and/or LERF is an indication of 
the effectiveness of an ISI programme. 
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 4 PSA IMPACT ON IN-SERVICE INSPECTION  
 
A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is made for most power plants. PSA 
determines the risk of core damage (level 1) and radioactive releases to the 
environment (level 2). A qualified PSA study should be used as the basis for 
evaluating the consequences of a pipe break. Its scope should include the availability 
of the following (parts of defence level 3): 
 
• Leak detection systems  
• Signals indicating failure detection or exceeded plant parameters 
• Reactor protection system  
• Emergency core cooling systems 
• Power supply systems  
• Service water system 
 
The frequency of event occurrence is in part a result of weaknesses at defence level 
1. The PSA covers all kind of events, transient and accidents, including pipe leakage 
or pipe breaks. The total risk of core damage and releases to the environment is 
evaluated against common goals and acceptance criteria. If the criteria are not met for 
the most risk-dominant accident sequences, utilities will have to consider 
countermeasures. Measures designed to reduce the overall risk might consist of 
changes in the design, changes in routines, procedures, methods or frequencies of 
supervision or periodic tests.  
 
The level of detail at which pipe break frequencies in PSA studies are modelled varies 
from user to user. The modelling in most PSAs is based on pipe break frequencies 
from databases that do not distinguish between different pipe design or pipe 
environments. Such knowledge is needed to support the development of an RI-ISI 
programme. The failure rate in PSA studies is the same for all pipes in large groups.  
 
If the risk of core damage and severe accident consequences is, after appropriate 
improvements at the plant, considered acceptable, further efforts in a specific area will 
have only a minor safety impact. This includes the consequences of large pipe 
breaks, where in most licensed plants further efforts to reduce the risks are 
considered ineffective. In this context, changes in the effectiveness of an ISI 
programme should be accepted as long as the overall risk stays constant (within the 
uncertainty boundaries) or is reduced.  
 
If changes in the ISI programme result in lower radiation doses, lower costs and/or 
constant or reduced risk, such a programme becomes attractive to utilities for reasons 
other than reactor safety.  
 
Risk reduction can be achieved by an optimised ISI programme, as it reduces the risk 
of pipe break frequency. Reduced core damage frequency and environmental hazards 
from pipe breaks will also be achieved by a broad set of alternative actions (plant 
modifications, operator training and procedures, plant supervision, etc). Such actions 
will in many cases result in greater risk reduction than an extended ISI programme. If 
a specific pipe area (for instance, a group of welds) dominates the risk (risk outliers) 
the total risk can be reduced by a more effective ISI programme but the preferred 
method is by modifications in the plant (new pipe design, new safety system design, 
etc.). 
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 When new failure mechanisms are discovered somewhere in the world and supported 
by measurements at a plant, the inspection programmes are revised immediately and 
the total risk of the new failure mechanism is evaluated. In the case of IGSCC and 
bimetallic welds, the new knowledge has resulted in a re-design of systems. In the 
case of thermal fatigue in mixing points, it has resulted in new mixers being installed 
in piping. With those changes, a total new risk profile becomes valid for the plant, and 
the ISI programme should be revised again. 
 
An extended ISI programme will be effective for such cases if the pipe failure rate is 
somewhat high and no modifications are planned to reduce the failure rates. The ISI 
programme will then reduce the pipe break frequency (strengthening DID level 2).  
 
Demands on the design and preoperational controls – defence level 1 – for 
components within the RCPB are extremely high. Experience has shown this to result 
in low failure rates. The good experience of defence level 1 affects the demands on 
the other defence levels, and the PSA will result in minor demands on defence level 2, 
as the deterministic design has put strong demands on defence levels 3 and 4.  
 
In systems with lower demands on defence level 1 (safety class 3 or less), experience 
has indicated that an extended ISI programme is more effective in reducing the risk as 
pipe break frequencies are higher and the deterministic demands on the following 
defence levels are lower.  
 
The knowledge set out in the two paragraphs above is based on observations from 
several PSA studies where large LOCAs do not dominate the CDF, not even in the 
group of failures from leakages and pipe breaks. 
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 5 OPERATING EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF ISI 
 
The established ISI methodologies are developed from operating experience and from 
research programmes on failure mechanisms in different materials and in different 
welding methods or techniques.  
 
For materials or conditions with known failure mechanisms or problems, an extended 
ISI programme is easy to justify. For welds in large pipes, the risk of degradation and 
cracks is considered extremely low, based on available worldwide experience. So, 
from the point of view of reactor safety alone, it is not fully justified to do frequent 
inspections of welding in those piping systems. The reactor safety at the plant is 
guaranteed by other defence-in-depth elements which aim to protect the environment 
and are considered appropriate on the strength of the deterministic and the 
probabilistic assessments performed.  
 
However, for such piping systems it is still important to extend our knowledge base on 
failure mechanisms and degradations, derived from operating experience 
programmes. Such programmes should, as a first priority, acquire worldwide 
experience, especially from twin plants or similar plant. The existing networks for 
sharing operating experiences (WANO, NEA) can be complemented by separate co-
operational programmes with plants that might be subject to the same (or similar) 
conditions. They can also be complemented by experience from research 
programmes. This should provide a basis for improving an operator's own ISI 
programme. In the past, this has proved to be an effective way of gaining new insights 
in previously unknown failure mechanisms. 
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 6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The above overview of the defence-in-depth strategy is aimed at putting the in-service 
inspection programme into the perspective of the entire nuclear safety concept. It also 
gives insights on how the defence-in-depth concept should be applied in developing 
ISI programmes. The ISI programme is part of the total defence in depth for the plant, 
with the aim of avoiding pipe breaks or leakages from the reactor coolant pressure 
boundary (RCPB) and, ultimately, avoiding radiological impact on the environment 
and the public. In more specific terms, we could say that: 
 
• The in-service inspection programme is one of five subsequent levels of 
preventing or mitigating strategies, and is not the last barrier.  
 
• The reactor coolant pressure boundary is one of four physical barriers for the 
confinement of radioactive material, and is not the last. 
 
• Weaknesses in the in-service programme are covered by the next barrier. 
 
Each physical barrier against radioactivity release, as well as each specific level in the 
defence-in-depth programme, is more or less independent of the others. Optimising 
an ISI programme should focus on the weaknesses in other defence-in-depth levels. 
The PSA is a suitable way of doing this. 
 
 
6.1 Reactor safety concerns 
A specific goal (criterion) must be defined for each level of defence. For the ISI 
programme (part of level 2), this will in most cases be related to and harmonised with 
frequencies of pipe breaks (weakness at level 1) and weaknesses at level 3 (function 
of safety systems) considered in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and PSA 
analyses.  
 
The FSARs and PSAs state that pipe break frequency is in the range 10-6 (small) to 
10-3 (large) per year. The FSAR and the PSA evaluations are based on these 
frequencies. A first level of criteria for ISI optimisation should be to ensure that pipe 
breaks do not exceed these frequencies. Different criteria could be developed for 
different size of piping.  
However, an evaluation which focuses only on failure frequencies will not reveal the 
strengths and weaknesses at defence levels 3 to 5, and will therefore not produce an 
optimised ISI programme. An ISI programme with these merits might recommend ISI 
activities to be focused on piping where the effects of the ISI programme are in fact 
negligible in terms of changes in the CDF or LERF. 
 
By evaluating the changes in core damage frequencies (level 1 PSA), the effects of 
DID level 3 will be part of the optimisation. By performing a level 2 PSA, the effects of 
DID level 4 and, in part, level 5 will be evaluated and become part of the optimisation. 
 
By evaluating the effects of an ISI programme by reference to changes in CDF (level 
1 PSA) it will be possible to identify those welds that have the greatest impact on core 
damage frequencies. Focusing ISI activities on welds with maximum impact on the 
CDF will increase the safety of the plant. 
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 Trying to achieve a “zero” goal for pipe-break frequency (<< 10-10) is certainly 
inefficient in both nuclear safety and economic terms. With DID strategies, leakages 
and pipe breaks of all sizes can be handled. The PSA evaluations will spell out which 
initiating events (cracks, etc) have the weakest defence-in-depth chain and where the 
ISI programme will have maximum effect.  
 
 
6.2 Non-reactor safety concerns  
To achieve enhanced reactor safety (i.e. reduce the CDF or LERF), the impact on 
both failure frequency and failure consequence need to be significant. If one of the 
factors is more or less insignificant, countermeasures will not impact on reactor safety.  
 
This means that if pipe break frequency is high on components with no impact on the 
reactor safety, ISI can be justified by reasons other than risk reduction, such as: 
 
• increased availability; 
• avoidance of bad publicity; 
• lower repair and clean-up costs; 
• occupational safety. 
 
On the other hand, if the pipe break frequency is extremely low, extending the ISI 
programme will not produce any further risk reduction, but can be justified by other 
means (goodwill, etc.) and will not produce any drawbacks.  
 
 
6.3 General conclusions 
Based on the above considerations, the goals of defence-in-depth for the ISI 
programme should be to: 
 
• ensure the validity of pipe break frequencies in the FSAR studies;  
 
• focus on the risk-dominant piping and welds, by making extensive use of PSA 
studies;  
 
• optimise the ISI programme, on economic terms and in terms of doses to 
workers, for welds with high failure probabilities and low core damage 
frequencies; 
 
• establish an operating experience programme to find new failure mechanisms in 
piping with extremely low failure frequencies.  
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Abstract 
The present work is the outcome of the activities of the ENIQ Task Group Risk (TGR) on 
Risk Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI). This document is intended to provide as a basis 
for discussion on how to apply defence in depth concepts within a Risk-Informed In-Service 
Inspection (RI-ISI) framework. The report discusses the role of the RI-ISI programme (and 
connected activities) within the entire reactor safety programme, with a special focus on the 
defence in depth philosophy for reactor safety.  
The mission of the Joint Research Centre is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the conception, 
development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Commission, the JRC functions 
as a reference centre of science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common 
interest of the Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national.
 
